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THE CRIMINAL MIND: NEUROSCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
AS A MITIGATING FACTOR IN SENTENCING IN NEW
SOUTH WALES, AUSTRALIA
Ellie A. Page†
Abstract:
“Neurolaw” is the emerging field of Law and Neuroscience that has the
potential to lend insight into an offender’s mental state and influence criminal
responsibility. In New South Wales, Australia, courts allow neuroscientific evidence of
an offender’s cognitive impairment as a consideration in sentencing proceedings. In this
comment, I discuss the discretionary nature of New South Wales’ sentencing regime and
the limitations of how neuroscience may be utilized within that regime. Although
neuroscientists can address the association of an offender’s cognitive impairment with the
commission of a crime, they cannot identify, with certainty, a causal relationship. I
analyze an original compilation of six case studies from New South Wales to illustrate
that sentencing judges resist mitigating offenders’ sentences based on evidence of a
cognitive impairment unless there are other factors favorable to the offender, such as a
guilty plea or a lack of criminal history. Judges’ resistance to using evidence of a
cognitive impairment alone to significantly mitigate an offender’s sentence indicates that
judges regard evidence of cognitive dysfunction as simply one factor in the holistic
framework at their discretion in sentencing, likely due to the lack of certainty surrounding
the nature of the relationship between an offender’s impairment and the commission of
the crime. Judges’ reluctance to use neuroscience as a significant mitigating factor also
maintains implications for the sustained retributivist nature of the criminal justice system
in New South Wales and raises the issue of whether the judiciary is the appropriate body
to apply neuroscience to the law.

I.

INTRODUCTION

On June 4, 2011 at 1:30 a.m. in New South Wales, Australia, 35-yearold Taskin Aslan approached the complainant as she walked toward a hotel.1
Aslan put his arm around her shoulders and forced her toward the entrance
of a nearby church.2 He then sexually assaulted the complainant.3
Aslan’s alcoholic father abused him as a child.4 He began using drugs
and alcohol at age twelve, and had a lengthy criminal history by the age of
eighteen.5 In his mid-twenties, Aslan was involved in two motor vehicle
accidents, after which neurological assessments revealed brain damage.6
Soon after the accidents, a clinical neuropsychologist reported that Aslan’s
†

J.D. candidate at the University of Washington School of Law class of 2017. The author would
like to thank her family for enduring her relentless thoughts about neurolaw.
1
Aslan v R [2014] NSWCCA 4, 9 (20 June 2014) (Austl.).
2
Id. at 4.
3
Id.
4
Id. at 10.
5
Id. at 10–11.
6
Id. at 13.

660

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 26 NO. 3

dysfunction in executive control,7 including inhibition difficulties, was
consistent with post-concussional disorder associated with traumatic brain
injury.8 In 2012, psychiatrist, Dr. Allnutt, reported that Aslan possibly
suffered ongoing cognitive difficulties as a consequence of his head injury,
such as impulsivity and poor judgment.9 The Court of Criminal Appeal
affirmed the District Court’s holding that Aslan’s brain injury did not
directly influence the commission of the 2011 offense and upheld the
aggregated sentence of a non-parole period of six years10 for one count of
indecent assault, one of attempted sexual intercourse without consent, and
two of sexual intercourse without consent.11
Modern brain science, including neuroimaging technologies and
advanced neurological assessments as reflected in Mr. Aslan’s case, has
materialized on the legal scene primarily over the last decade due to the
emerging12 field of Law and Neuroscience known as “Neurolaw.”13 In Law
and Neuroscience, Professor of Law and Biology at Vanderbilt University
and Director of the MacArthur Foundation on Law and Neuroscience, Owen
Jones, attributes the rise of Neurolaw to two factors: the nature of the legal
system and advancements in cognitive neuroscience.14 Criminal law in
particular largely revolves around the defendant's state of mind because it
requires both a bad act and a culpable state of mind.15 It raises questions
such as, what were the intentions of the alleged offender? Is the defendant
morally responsible?
Did the defendant have the capacity to act
16
differently?
Many relevant inquiries concerning the culpability of the
7

“Executive control” or “cognitive control,” discussed further in Part III, is defined as the deliberate
control of action, thought, and emotion necessary to respond to changing environmental conditions. It is
typically identified with the prefrontal cortex region of the brain, also discussed in Part III. Glossary, in
LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 757 (Owen Jones et al. eds., 2014).
8
Aslan v R [2014] NSWCCA 4, 9 (20 June 2014) (Austl.).
9
Id. at 19.
10
Id. at 3, 51.
11
Id. at 1.
12
In my research, I accessed a Neurolaw Database created by the University of Sydney and
Macquarie University, which contains Australian case law involving the use of neuroscientific evidence in
sentencing. The Database has over 100 criminal cases, only four of which predate 2000. Australian
Neurolaw Database, MACQUARIE UNIV. AND THE LAW SCHOOL AT THE UNIV. OF SYDNEY (2015),
https://neurolaw.edu.au/home. In addition, a 2014 neuroscience textbook edited by three neurolaw
scholars, states that 86 percent of the publications and cases included in the book were published only since
2000, and nearly 60 percent of those materials were published between 2008 and 2013. Law and
Neuroscience: An Overview of the Issues, in LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 4 (Owen Jones et al. eds., 2014).
13
Owen D. Jones & Matthew Ginther, Law and Neuroscience, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 13, 489 (James D. Wright ed., 2d ed. 2015).
14
Id.
15
Id. at 492.
16
Id. at 489.
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defendant therefore require, to varying degrees, an analysis of the
defendant's cognitive abilities,17 an assessment of which may suggest, for
example, that the defendant has impaired impulse control.18
Technological developments related to brain imaging make available
objective, reliable information about the structural and functional aspects of
the brain that may aid judges and juries in understanding a defendant’s state
of mind.19 Namely, cognitive neuroscience may speak to two aspects of
criminal responsibility: intention and sanity.20 However, as Professor Jones
asserts, the legal system must find a way to interpret neuroscientific
evidence in a way that is appropriate because “[Neuroscience] is one of
those things that holds both promise and terror for the legal system.”21
Professor Jones’ concerns about the nebulous future of neuroscience
in the courtroom contribute to an understanding of why sentencing judges in
New South Wales, Australia are not using neurological evidence of
offenders’ cognitive impairments to substantially mitigate their sentences,
even though they have the discretionary power to do so. The Law School at
the University of Sydney in Australia and Sydney’s Macquarie University
created an Australian Neurolaw Database in 2015, which contains case law
involving the use of neuroscientific evidence in sentencing.22 Many of the
criminal law-related cases maintained in the Database were decided in New
South Wales, a southeastern state in Australia, which is where I focus my
analysis.
In Part II of my comment, I will give a brief overview of Australia’s
judiciary and discuss Australia’s sentencing regime with an emphasis on
New South Wales. In addition, I will outline the sentencing considerations
judges in New South Wales utilize to mitigate offenders’ sentences, with an
emphasis on four mitigation principles developed through case law that
judges apply, at their discretion, when sentencing offenders with a mental
impairment. In Part III, I will discuss the advantages and limitations of
17

Id.
See ADRIAN RAINE, THE ANATOMY OF VIOLENCE 65–68 (2014).
19
Id.
20
Eyal Aharoni et al., Can Neurological Evidence Help Courts Assess Criminal Responsibility?
Lessons from Law and Neuroscience, 1124 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 145, 145 (2008).
21
Kevin Davis, Brain Trials: Neuroscience is Taking a Stand in the Courtroom, ABA J. (Nov. 01,
2012), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/brain_trials_neuroscience_is_taking_a_stand_in_the_c
ourtroom/ (emphasizing that neuroscientific evidence must be viewed and interpreted cautiously and
weighed with other evidence because it does not yet definitively explain criminal behavior).
22
Australian Neurolaw Database, MACQUARIE UNIV. AND THE LAW SCHOOL AT THE UNIV. OF
SYDNEY (2015), https://neurolaw.edu.au/home.
18
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neuroscience in the courtroom, with an emphasis on the sentencing phase of
criminal trials. I will focus on how neuroscience has the ability to help
mitigate the sentences of offenders who commit serious crimes, such as
violent or sexually motivated offenses. In Parts IV and V, I will do a novel
analysis of six case studies from New South Wales. The cases illustrate that
sentencing judges are resistant to significantly mitigating an offender’s
sentence based on neuroscientific evidence of a cognitive impairment, which
is used to inform four mitigation principles articulated in case law unless
there are additional factors favorable to the offender. Favorable factors may
include a guilty plea, no criminal history, or factual circumstances that
suggest the offense was out-of-character for the offender. I assert that
mitigation only in these select circumstances reveals that sentencing judges
are reluctant to use evidence of cognitive dysfunction as more than a single
factor in the holistic framework that determines an offender’s sentence. I
posit that judges are reluctant because neuroscience is not yet sufficiently
developed to allow a sentencing judge to identify a causal link between an
offender’s brain impairment and the commission of the crime. Neuroscience
is therefore not yet able to fully elucidate the psychology of criminal
responsibility. In addition, judges may lack the necessary expertise to apply
neuroscience in sentencing.
II. BACKGROUND ON SENTENCING IN NEW SOUTH WALES
Australia is comprised of six states, including New South Wales, and
two territories.23 It has a common law system, and maintains both federal
and state-level courts.24 The states and territories are self-governing,
meaning they are separate jurisdictions that each make their own laws.25
New South Wales’ trial courts are divided into three levels, each with
separate jurisdiction. At the lowest level is the Local Court, which handles
the least serious criminal matters, including “summary offences,”26 such as
stealing and possession of drugs.27 The “middle court” is the District Court,

23

Foreign Law Guide: Australia, BRILLONLINE REFERENCE WORKS (2015).
Id.
25
Id.
26
“Summary offenses” are lower-level criminal offenses that can only be heard and decided by a
magistrate, see Summary Offences, LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSION OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Oct. 18, 2016),
http://www.lawhandbook.sa.gov.au/ch12s04s01.php.
27
Role of New South Wales Courts and Tribunals, NSW GOV’T (Apr. 20, 2016),
http://www.courts.justice.nsw.gov.au/Pages/cats/which_court_or_tribunal/jurisdiction.aspx.
24
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which has jurisdiction over “indictable offenses”28 except murder, treason,
and piracy.29 The highest trial court is the New South Wales Supreme
Court, which deals with the most serious criminal matters, such as murder
and manslaughter, attempted murder, and treason.30 The New South Wales
Court of Criminal Appeal is the highest court for criminal matters and hears
appeals from the Supreme Court in addition to others.31 At the federal level
there are four main courts, the highest being the High Court of Australia,
which hears final appeals on criminal matters from federal, state, and
territory courts throughout the country.32
New South Wales has legislation that comprises a sentencing
framework33 subject to common law.34 Sentencing is largely entrusted to the
judiciary, the idea being that individual judges, not the legislature, should
dictate the sentencing process.35 This form of individualized justice can be
characterized as “instinctive synthesis,” meaning all considerations are
simultaneously balanced and weighed by the sentencing judge.36 However,
there are some mechanisms used to constrain judicial discretion; these
include guideline judgments, mandatory minimum sentences, standard nonparole periods, and aggravating and mitigating factors, which are explored
below.37
28

“Indictable offenses” are those for which the defendant has the right to trial by jury, see Indictable
Offences,
LEGAL
SERVICES
COMMISSION
OF
SOUTH
AUSTRALIA
(Dec.
1,
2015),
http://www.lawhandbook.sa.gov.au/ch13s03.php.
29
Role of New South Wales Courts and Tribunals, NSW GOV’T (Apr. 20, 2016),
http://www.courts.justice.nsw.gov.au/Pages/cats/which_court_or_tribunal/jurisdiction.aspx.
30
Common Law Division, SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES (May 20, 2015),
http://www.supremecourt.justice.nsw.gov.au/Pages/sco2_aboutus/sco2_divisionssupremecourt/sco2_comm
onlawdivision.aspx.
31
Court of Criminal Appeal, SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES (May 20, 2015),
http://www.supremecourt.justice.nsw.gov.au/Pages/sco2_aboutus/sco2_courtofcriminalappeal.aspx.
32
Role
of
the
High
Court,
HIGH
COURT
OF
AUSTRALIA
(2010),
http://www.hcourt.gov.au.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/about/role-of-the-high-court.
33
Sentencing Guidelines: Australia, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (2016), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/sentencingguidelines/australia.php.
34
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A(4) (“The court is not to have regard to any
such aggravating or mitigating factor in sentencing if it would be contrary to any Act or rule of law to do
so.”); see also R v Wickham [2004] NSWCCA para 23 (17 June 2004) (Austl.) (delineating the line of
authority making legislation subject to common law).
35
Sentencing Guidelines: Australia, supra note 33.
36
Id. With growing concern about sentencing inconsistencies, the Australian Law Reform
Commission completed a report on the sentencing of federal offenders in 2006. The report recommended
the adoption of an appointed commission to develop standardized numerical sentencing guidelines as is
practiced in the United States and the United Kingdom, but Australia did not follow the recommendation.
Australian courts generally perceived the idea of federal sentencing guidelines as contrary to individualized
justice.
37
Id.
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Guideline Judgments Have Limited Application

“Guideline judgments” are sentencing guidelines that apply to
particular offenses and penalties, as well as to classes of offenses, penalties,
and offenders.38 Guidelines are applied at the judge’s discretion, and are
considered in addition to other statutory factors, such as aggravating and
mitigating factors.39 The New South Wales Crime (Sentencing Procedure)
Act 1999 authorizes the Court of Criminal Appeal to give a guideline
judgment on the application of the Attorney General or on the Court’s own
motion.40 There are six guideline judgments applicable in New South Wales
that relate to select crimes and sentencing penalties.41 The Court has issued
no new guidelines since 2004, in part because courts are concerned the
guidelines could infringe on constitutional provisions related to the
separation of powers.42 Although guideline judgments have limited impact
because they are discretionary and narrow in scope due to separation of
powers concerns, there are additional means used to reconcile sentencing
discrepancies.
B.

Mandatory Minimum Sentences Are Discretionary

An additional mechanism for ameliorating sentencing disparities is
mandatory minimum sentences issued by the legislature.43 In New South
Wales, the Crimes Act 1900 prescribes mandatory maximum and minimum
penalties.44 However, the New South Wales Crimes (Sentencing Procedure)
Act 1999 explicitly makes sentencing discretionary, even in the case of
mandatory minimums. Section 21(2) specifies: “If by any provision of an
Act or statutory rule an offender is made liable to imprisonment for a
specified term, a court may nevertheless impose a sentence of imprisonment
for a lesser term.”45 Mandatory minimums are therefore not statutorily
mandatory unless legislation specifies that the mandatory minimum is
38

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 36.
Sentencing Guidelines: Australia, supra note 33; see also Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act
1999 (NSW) s 36–42A.
40
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 36–37A.
41
The six guideline judgments relate to: armed robbery; dangerous driving causing death or grievous
bodily harm; discounts for pleading guilty; taking further offenses into account; break, enter, and steal; and
high-range drink driving. See Sentencing Guidelines: Australia, supra note 33.
42
Id. (citing R v Wong & Leung [1999] NSWCCA 420 (explaining that the federal High Court
overruled a guideline judgment related to drug importation due to its inconsistency with federal
legislation)).
43
Sentencing Guidelines: Australia, supra note 33; see also Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).
44
Sentencing Guidelines: Australia, supra note 33; see also Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act
1999 (NSW).
45
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21(2).
39
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required regardless of Section 21 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure)
Act.46 Thus, with limited exceptions, sentencing is subject to the court’s
discretion in New South Wales.
C.

Standard Non-Parole Periods Are Discretionary, but Deviation
Must Be Justified

An offender’s sentence is further guided by the provisions of New
South Wales’ Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 that require a
standard non-parole approach.47 Part 4, Div 1A of the Act includes a table
that outlines the standard non-parole periods for numerous offenses defined
by the Crimes Act 1900.48 The non-parole periods for the specific offenses
delineated in Div 1A are representative of the sentences for offenses in the
middle of the range of objective seriousness.49 For example, the standard
non-parole period for reckless causing of grievous bodily harm is four
years.50 The sentencing judge must consider the standard non-parole period
in his or her sentencing considerations51 and make “a value judgment as to
what is the appropriate sentence given all the factors of the case.”52 Section
21(a)(1)(c) of the Crime (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 requires the
sentencing judge to account for any objective or subjective factors that affect
the seriousness of the offense.53 Although the standard non-parole periods
for the offenses outlined in Div 1A are nonbinding, the court must make a

46

There are only two offenses in New South Wales—assault causing death when intoxicated and
murder of police officers—carry mandatory minimums of eight years and life respectively, and nothing in
Section 21 or any other provision of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act can authorize a lesser sentence.
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 25B(2), 19B(4).
47
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 44, pt 4 div 1A.
48
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) pt 4 div 1A Table.
49
See Muldrock v The Queen [2011] 249 CLR 120 (HCA) (Austl.).
50
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) pt 4 div 1A Table item 4B.
51
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 54B.
52
Muldrock v The Queen [2011] 249 CLR 120 (HCA) (Austl.) (quoting Markarian v The Queen
[2005] 244 CLR 357 (HCA) (Austl.)).
53
The case law does not make clear whether factors personal to the offender may be used to
determine the objective seriousness of an offense. In R v Way (2004), the New South Wales Court of
Criminal Appeal delineated a number of factors affecting the objective seriousness of an offense, including
the offender’s motivation, mental illness, or intellectual disability. R v Way [2004] NSWCCA 131 (Austl.).
However, in Muldrock v The Queen (2011), the High Court of Australia held that “[T]he objective
seriousness of an offense is to be assessed without reference to matters personal to a particular offender . . .
[and] is to be determined wholly by reference to the nature of the offending. Muldrock v The Queen [2011]
249 CLR 120 (HCA) (Austl.). Subsequent to Muldrock, in Martin v R (2015), the New South Wales Court
of Criminal Appeal held that the applicant’s mental state at the time of the offense may influence the
objective seriousness of the offense. Martin v R [2015] NSWCCA 48–53 (10 February 2015) (Austl.).
Thus, whether the Way factors are matters affecting the objective seriousness of the offense or whether they
are matters personal to the offender is unclear post Muldrock.
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record of its reasons for setting a non-parole period that deviates from the
standard.54
D.

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors in Sentencing May Be
Used at a Court’s Discretion

The Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act also delineates aggravating
and mitigating factors, and maintains that a court may use them to increase
or decrease an offender’s sentence.55 The mitigating factors include, among
others, that the offender is unlikely to re-offend or the offender is a person of
good character.56 In addition, if an offender is suffering from a mental illness,
intellectual handicap, or other mental or emotional impairment or disability,
the courts have developed five principles (“Principles”) to be applied when
sentencing, four of which are mitigatory. However, none of these Principles
are absolute and the court may use its discretion in deciding whether to
reduce an offender's sentence based on one or more of the factors.57 “Over
the years the applicable principles have evolved,” but were recently and
clearly re-stated in Aslan v R; they are as follows:
[Principle 1] Where the state of a person’s mental health
contributes to the commission of the offence in a material way,
the offender’s moral culpability may be reduced. Consequently
the need to denounce the crime may be reduced with a
reduction in the sentence…
[Principle 2] It may also have the consequence that an offender
is an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence resulting in a
reduction in the sentence which would otherwise have been
imposed…
[Principle 3] It may mean that a custodial sentence may weigh
more heavily on the person. Because the sentence will be more
onerous for that person the length of the prison term or the
conditions under which it is served may be reduced . . .

54

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 54B(3); see also Muldrock v The Queen [2011]
249 CLR 120 (HCA) (Austl.) (holding that div 1A requires sentencing judges to state fully the reasons for
arriving at the sentence imposed, which assists in appellate review).
55
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A(2)–(5).
56
Id. s 21A(3).
57
Id. s 21A(5).
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[Principle 4] It may reduce or eliminate the significance of
specific deterrence . . .
[Principle 5] Conversely, it may be that because of a person's
mental illness, they present more of a danger to the community.
In those circumstances, considerations of specific deterrence
may result in an increased sentence . . . Where a person has
been diagnosed with an Antisocial Personality Disorder there
may be a particular need to give consideration to the protection
of the public. . .” (internal citations omitted, italics added).58
Guideline judgments, mandatory minimums, standard non-parole
periods, and aggravating and mitigating factors encourage limited
consistency in sentencing because sentencing judges maintain great
discretion. Judges retain the power to decide how they will weigh particular
considerations and which factors will contribute to their sentencing decisions
as part of the instinctive synthesis judicial model.
III.

THE SCIENCE OF NEUROLAW

Recently, science has made significant advancements in
understanding the brain. Aristotle thought the organ was a radiator to cool
blood, while Descartes thought it was an antenna for the spirit to
communicate with the body.59 Neuroscience has developed to the extent that
it is being introduced as evidence in the courtroom to support or challenge
the degree of an offender's culpable mental state or to gauge an offender’s
level of danger.60 A function of the legal system is to determine how and
why a person behaved as he or she did and to allocate punishment
accordingly, which neuroscience can sometimes help illuminate.61 There
are two broad roles of neuroscience in law: to deepen psychological
knowledge concerning criminal responsibility, which I discuss in this
comment, and to generate new tools for purposes of reducing recidivism or
enabling direct brain interventions.62 In its current state, however, there
remain limitations on the degree to which neuroscience can inform criminal
law. Neuroscience is not yet sufficiently developed to determine causality
58

Aslan v R [2014] NSWCCA 4, 9 (20 June 2014) (Austl.) (citing Director of Public Prosecutions v
De La Rosa [2010] 177 NSWCCA 177 (17 December 2010) (Austl.)).
59
See RAINE, supra note 18, at 65.
60
Owen D. Jones et. al., Law and Neuroscience, THE JOURNAL OF NEUROSCIENCE 17624, 17624
(2013) [hereinafter Jones et. al., Law and Neuroscience].
61
Id.
62
Id. at 17628.
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between an offender’s brain dysfunction and the commission of a crime with
adequate certainty to absolve an offender of his or her mental culpability and
therefore, of criminal responsibility.63
A determination of how
neuroscientific evidence could be used to negate an offender’s mental state
and thereby mitigate an offender’s culpability in the “guilt phase”64 of a
criminal trial is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, an analysis of how
neuroscientific evidence of a cognitive impairment can be used in the
“sentencing phase”65 to reduce an offender’s sentence within the framework
of the four mitigating Principles articulated in the case law66 is more
compatible with the current state of neuroscience. To better identify how
neuroscience can be used in the courtroom, it is important to understand the
role of neuroscientific imaging tools, applicable brain anatomy, how
structural and/or functional brain abnormalities can manifest, the current
limitations of neuroscience, and how these limitations complicate the use of
neuroscientific evidence in the courtroom.
A.

Neuroscientific Tools Are Used to Detect Structural and
Functional Brain Impairment

The two broad categories of scans used to detect brain dysfunction are
structural and functional scans.67 Structural scans are used to evaluate the
structure of the brain to detect injury and large-scale disease, such as a
tumor.68 Functional imaging attributes functional roles to specific brain
regions by enabling information processing by brain centers to be visualized
directly; processing causes the involved area of the brain to increase glucose
metabolism and “light up” on the scan.69 Two of the most utilized imaging
tools are the MRI (magnetic resonance imaging), which provides both

63

See Owen D. Jones et al., Neuroscientists in Court, 14 NATURE REVS. 730, 734 (2013) [hereinafter
Jones et al., Neuroscientists in Court]
64
“Guilt phase” refers to the portion of criminal proceedings in which the defendant pleads guilty, is
found guilty, or is acquitted. What are the different stages of an average court case? NSW COURTS (Sep.
21, 2016), http://nswcourts.com.au/articles/what-are-the-different-stages-of-an-average-court-case/.
65
“Sentencing phase” refers to the portion of criminal proceedings after the defendant has plead
guilty or is found guilty, and the judge hands down a sentence. What are the different stages of an average
court case? NSW COURTS (Sep. 21, 2016), http://nswcourts.com.au/articles/what-are-the-different-stagesof-an-average-court-case/.
66
Aslan v R [2014] NSWCCA 4, 9 (20 June 2014) (Austl.) (citing Director of Public Prosecutions v
De La Rosa [2010] 177 NSWCCA 177 (17 December 2010) (Austl.)).
67
For a detailed explanation of the various brain imaging tools available, see Brain Monitoring and
Manipulation, in LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 221–33 (Owen Jones et al. eds., 2014).
68
Brain Imaging, SEMEL INST. FOR NEUROSCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR: UCLA (2011),
https://www.semel.ucla.edu/taxonomy_view/19/505?type=group.
69
Id.
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structural and functional information,70 and the PET (positron-emission
tomography) scan, which is a purely functional scan.71
The effects of structural and/or functional brain impairment vary
depending on which part of the brain is dysfunctional. Most relevant to
neurolaw is the frontal lobe, which is the largest of the four lobes of the
brain and constitutes the most frontal region of the brain.72 The frontal lobe
controls motor and executive functions, including the ability to navigate
social relationships, communicate, and plan.73 The frontal lobe is further
divided into three areas based on function, including the prefrontal cortex,74
which sits right above the eyes immediately behind the forehead.75 The
prefrontal cortex is regarded as the “CEO” of the brain and is responsible for
the highest-level control of behavior and decision-making power.76 It is
critical for the ability to predict outcomes, delay gratification, compare
multiple options, assess risk, and adapt to changing circumstances.77
To better recognize the contribution that neuroscience can make and
the pivotal role of the prefrontal cortex in decision making, consider the
work of Dr. Adrian Raine, a Professor of Criminology, Psychiatry and
Psychology at the University of Pennsylvania.78 Raine is a leading authority
on the biology of violence and is the first person to have conducted a brain
imaging study on murderers.79 In 1994, Raine sought to measure the
functional capacity of the brains of forty-one accused murderers and fortyone controls by using the PET scan, which, as an imaging tool that measures
brain function, documents how well different parts of the brain metabolize
glucose.80 He hypothesized that the brains of murderers would use less
glucose, a sign of lower or non-activation, compared to the brains of the
control group.81 His study confirmed that this is, indeed, the case, and
provided the first brain-imaging evidence to show that the brains of a large
70

What is fMRI?, CTR. FOR FUNCTIONAL MRI: UC SAN DIEGO SCHOOL OF MEDICINE (2016),
http://fmri.ucsd.edu/Research/whatisfmri.html.
71
RAINE, supra note 18, at 66; see also Valentina Berti et al., PET/CT in Diagnosis of Dementia,
1228 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 81(2011).
72
Brain Structure and Function, in LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 207 (Owen Jones et al. eds., 2014).
73
Id. at 209.
74
See RAINE, supra note 18, at 66.
75
Brain Structure and Function, supra note 72, at 207.
76
Id. at 210.
77
Id. at 211.
78
See RAINE, supra note 18.
79
Id. at 68; see also Criminologist Believes Violent Behavior is Biological, NPR (March 21. 2014),
http://www.npr.org/2014/03/21/292375166/criminologist-believes-violent-behavior-is-biological.
80
RAINE, supra note 18, at 65–67.
81
Id.
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sample of murderers are functionally different from those of the general
population.82 Overall, the forty-one murderers showed a considerable
reduction in prefrontal glucose metabolism compared with the controls,
meaning a reduction in activation.83 This abnormality in the prefrontal cortex
manifests itself at numerous levels:
1. At an emotional level, reduced prefrontal cortex functioning results in
loss of control over the limbic system, which controls emotions like
anger and rage.84
2. At a behavioral level, research on neurological patients with prefrontal
cortex damage indicates an increase in risk-taking, irresponsibility,
and rule-breaking.85
3. At a personality level, frontal damage is associated with impulsivity,
loss of self-control, and inability to modify and inhibit behavior
appropriately.86
4. At a social level, abnormality can translate into poor social
judgment.87
5. At a cognitive level, prefrontal cortex dysfunction can manifest as a
loss of intellectual flexibility, and poor problem-solving skills.88
There are therefore five reasons to expect that impaired prefrontal cortex
functioning could predispose a person to violence.89 Raine asserts that “poor
prefrontal cortex functioning is the best-replicated90 correlate of antisocial
and violent behavior.”91
82

Id. at 68.
Id. at 66–67.
84
Id. at 67.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 68.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Note, however, that not all violent offenders have poor prefrontal cortex functioning. There is a
reactive-proactive aggression spectrum that reflects brain function. For example, while most murders are
on the reactive-aggression side, “predatory killers,” who are often serial killers, are on the proactiveaggression side and have good prefrontal cortex function, which allows them to carefully plan their
criminal acts. For further discussion, see RAINE, supra note 18, at 78–80; see also Adrian Raine et al., The
Reactive-Proactive Aggression Questionnaire: Differential Correlates of Reactive and Proactive
Aggression in Adolescent Boys, 32 AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR 159 (2010).
91
RAINE, supra note 18, at 68; accord Norman Relkin et al., Impulsive Homicide Associated with an
Arachnoid Cyst and Unilateral Frontotemporal Cerebral Dysfunction, in LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 53
83
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Although there are multiple brain areas that can predispose someone to
violence, the region of the brain most indicative of violence when
dysfunctional is the prefrontal cortex.92 Raine therefore argues that repeated
violent offending may be perceived as a clinical disorder.93 However, Raine
also acknowledges the limitations of neuroscience and admits that “the
antisocial brain is a patchwork of dysfunctional neural systems and we are
only just on the threshold of putting together these neural pieces to better
understand it.”94
B.

The Application of Neuroscience to Criminal Law Is Limited in
Scope

The extent to which neuroscience can be applied in a legal context
remains limited as neuroscience continues to develop and the brain’s
intricate systems leave much to be discovered. As Raine indicated, there is
ambiguity concerning how structural and functional impairment of the brain
may affect an individual’s state of mind and an individual’s ability to control
his or her actions. Stephen Morse from the University of Pennsylvania
asserts that the pressing question is whether the developments in
neuroscience are even legally relevant because neuroscience only makes a
proposition about responsibility more or less likely to be true.95 For
example, fMRI studies deal in average differences between groups, meaning
there is some overlap between normal and abnormal brain function.96 This
lack of specificity poses a challenge to the introduction of neuroscientific
evidence in criminal proceedings.
Generally, in order to establish legal relevance, an expert must be able
to explain how the neuro-evidence informs whether the specific defendant
acted, whether he or she formed the required mens rea, or whether he or she
met the criteria for an excusing condition.97 Science has advanced to the
point that we know a functioning brain is a necessary condition for
possessing a mental state and for acting, but we do not know how mental
states and action are caused; we do not have sophisticated causal knowledge
(Owen Jones et al. eds., 2014) (asserting that one of the known effects of prefrontal dysfunction is a
predisposition to stimulus-bound aggression).
92
RAINE, supra note 18, at 98–99.
93
Id. at 336.
94
Id. at 99.
95
Stephen J. Morse, Criminal Law and Common Sense: An Essay on the Perils and Promise of
Neuroscience, 99 MARQUETTE L. REV. 39, 58 (2015).
96
Virginia Hughes, Science in Court: Head Case, in LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 7 (Owen Jones et al.
eds., 2014).
97
Id.
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of how the brain works generally.98
Morse argues that although
neuroscience currently may not be able to contribute to more accurate
criminal law policy, doctrine, or individual case adjudication in the guilt
phase, advances in technology and science may allow us to better understand
criminal behavior in the future.99 Though neuroscience is not yet
sufficiently advanced to allow for definitive conclusions about cause and
effect as Morse suggests, empirical studies like Raine’s indicate that
functional impairments are at least correlated with violence.100 A question
then arises regarding who is qualified to make decisions regarding how
neuroscience should be and can be used in criminal trials, or how
neuroscience will be weighed and applied in the sentencing phase.
C.

The Appropriate Role of Judges Versus Experts Is Uncertain

Because neurolaw is a burgeoning field and neuroscience is
increasingly being offered as evidence in the courtroom, it is important to
understand the capacity of judges to effectively use neuroscientific evidence
when sentencing offenders.101 Judges often need guidance concerning the
applicability and viability of neurological evidence.102 As is mentioned in
the previous subsection, because neuroscientific studies are based on group
data,103 it is particularly important that neuroscientists help decision-makers
avoid under-interpreting and over-interpreting neuroscientific evidence
concerning causation and correlation issues.104
Joshua Buckholtz,
psychologist at Harvard, says “[t]he task of integrating brain science into the
judicial system will in large part be the responsibility of judges,” and how it
works will depend on how well judges understand “what a scientific study is
and what it says and what it doesn’t say and can’t say.”105 Judges, on the
whole, have little training in, knowledge of, or inclination to learn science.106
They regularly rely on applied science as an integral part of lawmaking,
meaning it is necessary that judges understand probabilities and statistics.107
98

Id. at 59.
Id. at 71–72.
100
RAINE, supra note 18, at 68.
101
See Jones et al., Neuroscientists in Court, supra note 63, at 733.
102
Id.
103
Jones et al., Law and Neuroscience, supra note 60, at 625.
104
Jones et al., Neuroscientists in Court, supra note 63, at 734.
105
Jon Hamilton, The Case Against Brain Scans As Evidence In Court, SHOTS HEALTH NEWS FROM
NPR (Nov. 12, 2013, 3:02 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2013/11/12/244566090/brainscans-shouldnt-get-their-day-in-court-scientists-say.
106
David L. Faigman, Judges as “Amateur Scientists,” 86 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1207, 1207 (2006).
107
Id.
99
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The idea that judges may not be the best qualified to weigh
neuroscientific evidence in the courtroom provokes questions surrounding
who is best equipped to apply neuroscience to the law. There is concern that
the sentencing judge may not be the actor best qualified to determine how
evidence of a cognitive impairment may affect general or specific deterrence
or an offender’s moral culpability, and therefore, if or to what extent a brain
impairment should serve as a mitigating factor. Thus, although Professor
Jones asserts that the engagement of law with neuroscientific evidence was
inevitable,108 there remains uncertainty surrounding the relationship between
a cognitive impairment and the commission of an offense, and concerning
the actor best suited to make definitive judgments about this relationship and
its effect on an offender’s sentence. The application of neuroscience to the
law therefore remains limited in scope.
IV.

SIX CASE STUDIES FROM NEW SOUTH WALES LEND INSIGHT INTO THE
USE OF NEUROSCIENCE IN SENTENCING

Neuroscientific evidence of an offender’s cognitive impairment may be
introduced as a consideration in sentencing in New South Wales.109
However, based on six case studies from New South Wales, analyzed here
for the first time as a set with respect to the weight given to neuroscientific
evidence, it is clear that sentencing judges resist using neurological evidence
alone to mitigate violent offenders' sentences. The following six cases
illustrate how New South Wales courts applied, either by name or more
generally, the Principles articulated in case law and delineated in Part II.
These Principles include the impairment’s effect on the general or specific
deterrence value of imprisonment, if the impairment would cause the
sentence to weigh more heavily on the offender by comparison to the
average inmate, and if the impairment warrants reduced moral culpability, or
conversely, if the impairment warrants an enhanced sentence due to
increased danger to the community.110 First, I will present three cases
demonstrating circumstances in which courts are more likely to find that an
offender’s impairment warrants a reduction in sentencing. I will contrast
those cases with three cases illustrating circumstances in which courts resist
mitigating an offender’s sentence based on evidence of a cognitive
impairment. I summarize these cases in Table 1 at the end of this section.

108
109
110

Jones et al., Law and Neuroscience, supra note 60, at 735.
Aslan v R [2014] NSWCCA 4, 9 (20 June 2014) (Austl.).
Aslan v R [2014] NSWCCA 4, 9 (20 June 2014) (Austl.).
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Circumstances in which Evidence of an Offender’s Cognitive
Impairment Is Used as a Significant Mitigating Factor
1.

R v Terrence David Kain111

On February 27, 2011, after a fight with his mother, Mr. Kain claims
that he remembers pushing her and then seeing her lying beside the bed,
dead.112 Mr. Kain is an alcoholic and suffers from depression, which has
manifested in self-harming behaviors.113 Clinical neuropsychologist, Dr.
Hepner, whose results were accepted by both the prosecution and defense,
asserted that Mr. Kain's heavy drinking likely lead to impairment of his
executive functioning, and that 98% of Mr. Kain's peers, matched for age
and other background characteristics, would perform better than him if
tested on executive functioning.114 Dr. Hepner concluded that there is no
doubt Mr. Kain suffers from an alcohol-induced persisting dementia.115 In
addition, an MRI brain study conducted in 2012 showed diffuse brain
damage, likely from alcoholism.116 The effects of damage to the frontal part
of the brain, including poor judgment and lack of behavioral control, are
exacerbated in times of anger or emotional stress as they would have been
during Mr. Kain’s fight with his mother.117
Although manslaughter carries a maximum term of 25 years, the
Supreme Court of New South Wales held that Mr. Kain’s case “should [not]
attract the maximum sentence or anything near it.”118 The Court noted that
Mr. Kain entered a guilty plea at the commencement of his trial, did not
have a criminal history, and showed genuine remorse.119 The Court
primarily relied on Mr. Kain’s impaired executive functioning in mitigating
his sentence,120 and found that “his mental condition is obviously of
considerable importance in measuring his moral and criminal
responsibility”.121 Writing for the Court, Justice Adams asserted, “I have no
doubt . . . that . . . [Mr. Kain’s] loss of control was substantially influenced
by his dementia. In short, if Mr. Kain had not suffered from this condition, I
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

R v Terrence David Kain [2013] NSWSC 638 (24 May 2013) (Austl.).
Id. at 8.
Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 25, 30.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 24.
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think it very improbable indeed that he would have acted as he did.”122 As a
result of Mr. Kain's psychiatric condition, the Court found that Mr. Kain was
not an appropriate vehicle for deterrence, was not a danger to the public, and
that his mental condition would make prison more challenging for him than
the ordinary prisoner.123 The Court sentenced Mr. Kain to a non-parole
period of four years.124
2.

EG v R125

In February of 2013, the applicant was caring for his four
grandchildren until his daughter-in-law arrived to collect them.126 It had
been a difficult afternoon when his two-year-old granddaughter said she
needed to be changed.127 While she was on the changing table with no
clothing on the lower part of her body, he bent down and licked her on the
outside of her vagina.128 He admitted to doing so.129 The applicant said he
did not know why he did it and had never done anything of the kind to any
other child.130
Psychiatrist, Dr. Nielssen, diagnosed the applicant with mild
dementia.131 Dr. Nielssen noted that an MRI scan of the brain showed
widespread small vessel disease, as well as a stroke affecting the temporal
and parietal lobes of the brain.132 He noted the applicant’s slow response
time and lethargic emotional responses, which were consistent with the
diagnosis.133 Although Dr. Nielssen concluded that any connection between
those conditions and the commission of the offense was unclear, he noted
that the applicant reported changes in his usual behavior, and Dr. Nielssen
formed the opinion that the applicant may have had a loss of judgment and
inhibition as a result of the effects of the stroke and widespread

122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

Id. at 22.
Id. at 27, 29.
Id. at 32.
EG v R [2015] NSWCCA 21 (3 March 2015) (Austl.).
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 13.
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cerebrovascular disease.134 Further, the applicant recognized what he had
done was wrong.135
The District Court sentenced the applicant to imprisonment with a
non-parole period of two years and six months.136 The maximum penalty for
aggravated sexual intercourse with a child under ten years of age is
imprisonment for life137 and a standard non-parole period of 15 years.138 On
appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeal found that the sentence imposed by the
sentencing judge was manifestly excessive.139 The Court determined that
the principles of sentencing relevant to cases involving child sexual abuse,
including general deterrence, denunciation, and protection of the
community, attracted little weight given the unusual nature of the case.140
The Court found that the applicant’s mental condition, supported by the MRI
scan, could have adversely affected his judgment, and the fact that the
applicant could neither understand nor explain his actions made specific
deterrence and protection of the community less significant.141 Because the
factual circumstances were so unusual and there was no sexual gratification
element, the Court found that although denunciation required a term of
imprisonment, the applicant’s sentence should be mitigated.142 Ultimately,
the Court held that due to the applicant’s age, deteriorating mental condition,
and its relation to and the nature of the offense, a mitigated sentence of a
non-parole period of one year would be more just.143
3.

Carroll v R144

On January 5, 2010, applicant Peter Carroll pulled his vehicle in front
of the victim, Anthony Staunch’s van.145 Mr. Staunch had to brake suddenly
to avoid a collision, and shook his head in disapproval.146 Shortly thereafter,
Mr. Carroll stopped his vehicle in the middle of the road, causing Mr.
Staunch to brake again, and an argument ensued.147 Mr. Carroll grabbed a
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 1.
Id.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 41–42.
Id. at 43–46.
Id. at 44–48.
Carroll v R [2010] 239 FLR 11 (NSWCCA) (Austl.).
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 10–11.
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knife from his vehicle, at which point Mr. Staunch returned to his van to
protect himself.148 Mr. Carroll cut Mr. Staunch on his right forearm and
inflicted a slash across Mr. Staunch’s face from his mouth towards his ear
before speeding off.149 Mr. Carroll plead guilty to wounding with intent to
cause grievous bodily harm.150
Dr. Allnutt issued a psychiatric report of Mr. Carroll on behalf of the
defense and not subject to cross-examination by the Crown.151 He found
that Mr. Carroll had suffered a head injury with loss of consciousness and
had been diagnosed with a seizure disorder secondary to the head injury.152
Mr. Carroll expressed to Dr. Allnutt that there had been a change in his
behavior and he had become more irritable and more prone to aggression.153
Dr. Allnutt noted his suspicion that Mr. Carroll likely had lobe damage,
contributing to a diminished capacity for self-control and vulnerability to
acting impulsively and aggressively.154 He concluded that it was unlikely
Mr. Carroll’s disorder played a direct role in the offense, but his cognitive
impairments could have.155 Mr. Carroll also expressed remorse and a desire
to apologize to the victim.156 Although Mr. Carroll had a criminal history
involving multiple assaults,157 in the ten years prior to the offense he had
only one offense involving violence for which he was fined, meaning it
involved a low level of criminality.158
The Court of Criminal Appeal found that the sentencing judge wrongly
held Mr. Carroll’s mental state did not in any way contribute to the
commission of the offense and should have considered how either general or
specific deterrence may have been reduced, or if Mr. Carroll’s moral
culpability should have been mitigated.159 The Court articulated the
applicable Principles to illustrate the ways in which mental illness or
disorder may be relevant and noted that the application of the Principles is
not limited to cases of serious psychiatric illness.160 The Court found that
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160

Id. at 13.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 23, 26.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 38–39.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 57–58.
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because Mr. Carroll suffered two head injuries, which lead to neurological
complications manifesting in seizures and causing poor temper control, Mr.
Carroll’s mental state did impact the commission of the offense and should
have been taken into account in sentencing.161 Ultimately, the Court held
that “significant weight must be given when determining a sentence to the
impact that the applicant’s head injuries have had on his behavior . . . it
seems obvious . . . that poor temper control played a significant role . . . .”162
Although the standard non-parole period for wounding or grievous bodily
harm with intent is seven years, and the sentencing judge imposed a nonparole period of six years, the Court found that a mitigated non-parole period
of four years was more appropriate.163
B.

Circumstances in which Evidence of an Offender’s Cognitive
Impairment Is Not Used as a Significant Mitigating Factor
1.

Aslan v R164

Mr. Aslan, whose case is briefly discussed in the Introduction, was
convicted of one count of indecent assault, one of attempted sexual
intercourse without consent, and two of sexual intercourse without
consent.165 As previously mentioned, Mr. Aslan suffered maltreatment as a
child and neurological assessments after two motor vehicle accidents
revealed that Mr. Aslan had brain damage.166 He was diagnosed with severe
depression, anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorder,167 and a clinical
neuropsychologist reported that Mr. Aslan’s dysfunction in executive
functioning, including inhibition difficulties, was consistent with postconcussional disorder associated with traumatic brain injury.168 After Mr.
Aslan was charged, psychiatrist, Dr. Allnutt, reported that Aslan possibly
suffered ongoing cognitive difficulties as a consequence of his head injury,
such as impulsivity and poor judgment.169 In addition, Mr. Aslan manifested
symptoms consistent with persistent drug-induced psychotic symptoms
likely related to his long-term substance abuse history.170
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170

Id. at 61, 63.
Id. at 102-–03.
Id. at 6–7, 108.
Aslan v R [2014] NSWCCA 4, 9 (20 June 2014) (Austl.).
Id. at 1.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 19.
Id.
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Dr. Allnutt testified on behalf of the defense that at the time of the
alleged offense, Mr. Aslan was experiencing ongoing cognitive problems
derived from his head injury, and was also suffering from blackouts where
he would lose memory of events, likely from his long-term substance
abuse.171 Although the sentencing judge accepted that “the injury left Aslan
with less capacity to exercise care and judgment as to the use of . . . drugs
and alcohol . . .,” he did “not accept . . . that there was any direct impact of
the acquired brain injury on . . . [Mr. Aslan’s] offending . . . .”172 The
District Court therefore found that Mr. Aslan’s cognitive impairment did not
reduce his moral culpability, though it would make Mr. Aslan’s prison term
more onerous, “moderat[ing] to a very small degree the requirements calling
for general deterrence.”173 On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeal noted
that it has had to grapple with the effect on sentencing of mental illness,
intellectual handicap, or mental or emotional impairment.174 A “central
question” is whether the condition had a “causative role to play” in the
commission of the offense, in which case it is at the court’s discretion to
mitigate the sentence based on a finding of reduced moral culpability or
specific or general deterrence.175 The Court of Criminal Appeal affirmed the
District Court’s holding that Mr. Aslan’s brain injury did not directly
influence the commission of the offense and affirmed the sentence of a nonparole period of six years.176
2.

R v Lane177

On February 20, 2010, Tanya Lane shot Renae Burns’ long-time
partner, Steven Quire.178 Some weeks later, his body was found buried in a
shallow grave.179
Ms. Lane and Ms. Burns were in an intimate
180
relationship.
Although there was uncertainty concerning the degree to
which Ms. Burns, who pled guilty as an accessory after the fact,181 was

171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181

Id. at 20.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 34–35.
Id. at 3, 51.
R v. Lane [2013] 241 A Crim R 321 (NSWSC) (Austl.).
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 1.
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involved in the shooting and burial,182 Ms. Lane pled guilty to Mr. Quire’s
murder.183
Ms. Lane was 25-years-old at the time of the murder and had no
previous convictions.184 Ms. Lane had a difficult upbringing.185 At the age
of six she was sexually abused by a member of her extended family and did
not have a supportive relationship with her mother, whose partner was an
alcoholic.186 She developed epilepsy at 16, and an MRI scan while she was
in custody revealed long standing abnormalities of the brain that were likely
of congenital origin.187 Psychologist, Dr. Reid, and psychiatrist, Dr.
Nielssen, independently examined Ms. Lane on behalf of the defense.188 Dr.
Reid concluded that Ms. Lane showed decline in her intellectual functions
and deficits in her speed and flexibility of thinking, which was supported by
the MRI’s indication of acquired brain impairment.189 Dr. Nielssen found
that Ms. Lane’s significant anxiety and depression around the time of the
offense in conjunction with her congenital brain conditions, should allow her
to raise those issues in mitigation.190
The Supreme Court of New South Wales accepted that Ms. Lane’s
“mental problems” affected her judgment, but concluded they were more
emotional than cognitive so she was not entitled to any marked degree of
leniency.191 Although the standard non-parole period for murder is 20 years,
the Court found that due to Ms. Lane’s prior good character, the nature of
the offense, her guilty plea, and the statutory ratio required by the Crimes
(Sentencing Procedure) Act,192 it would impose a slightly mitigated nonparole period of 17 years.193

182

Id. at 2–14.
Id. at 1.
184
Id. at 17.
185
Id. at 18.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 17.
189
Id. at 22.
190
Id.
191
Id. at 30.
192
Section 44(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 requires the balance of the terms of
the sentence not exceed one-third of the non-parole period for the sentence unless there are special
circumstances, see Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) div 21A.
193
R v Lane [2013] 241 A Crim R 321 (NSWSC) (Austl.).
183
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R v Sullivan194

On October 3, 2007, Mr. Prochilo went over to Mr. Sullivan's house,
likely to purchase drugs or borrow money.195 Mr. Sullivan, thinking that Mr.
Prochilo had stolen his wallet, met Mr. Prochilo in the doorway.196 They
proceeded into the house, and after a brief struggle, Mr. Sullivan stabbed
Mr. Prochilo in the chest.197 Mr. Prochilo died before emergency services
arrived,198 and the jury found Mr. Sullivan guilty of murder.199
More than two decades prior to the incident, Mr. Sullivan was the
victim of an assault, resulting in a right parietal skull fracture, after which he
was reported to be aggressive.200 In 1986, not long after the assault, Mr.
Sullivan was convicted of manslaughter,201 after which an MRI scan
confirmed a cerebral injury.202 Prior to Mr. Sullivan’s trial for the murder of
Mr. Prochilo, Dr. Allnutt, on behalf of the defense, reviewed the results of
previous neuropsychological testing and concluded that Mr. Sullivan
suffered from a range of cognitive impairments suggesting frontal lobe
damage, commonly associated with an increased risk of impulsive behavior
and poor judgment.203 In addition, at the time of the offense, a number of
elements likely influenced Mr. Sullivan’s actions, including his brain
impairment, substance intoxication, and depressive symptoms.204
In its reasoning, the Supreme Court of New South Wales recited the
four mitigating Principles that should be considered when an offender is
mentally ill, in addition to the countervailing consideration that the offender
presents an increased danger to the community.205 The Court recognized
that Mr. Sullivan’s brain damage impacted his mental and psychosocial
functioning, which increased the risk of him overreacting to Mr. Prochilo.206
Although Mr. Sullivan's brain dysfunction slightly mitigated the need for
general deterrence, it did not reduce Mr. Sullivan's moral culpability, in part
194

R v Sullivan [2010] NSWSC 755 (9 July 2010) (Austl.), aff’d, Sullivan v R [2012] NSWCCA 41

(Austl.).
195
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199
200
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R v Sullivan [2010] NSWSC 755 (9 July 2010) (Austl.).
Id. at 17.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 16, 20.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 44–45.
Id. at 55–56.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 63.
Id.
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because the Court agreed with Dr. Allnutt’s assessment that it was one
among many factors contributing to the commission of the offense.207 Mr.
Sullivan's brain impairment was therefore not sufficiently causally related to
qualify as an objective factor affecting the seriousness of the offense that
could be used to significantly mitigate his sentence.208 The Court found that
“despite…being satisfied that the probabilities favour the offender's brain
damage as having some causal connection with the commission of the
offence,” the standard non-parole period of 20 years “remains the most
significant point of reference.”209
The Court’s reasoning was heavily influenced by Mr. Sullivan’s
previous conviction for manslaughter, and it determined that Mr. Sullivan
posed a significant risk to community safety, which counteracted the
mitigatory impact of his neurological and physiological dysfunction on his
sentence.210 In addition, the court noted that Mr. Sullivan did not express
remorse, but instead “expressed some satisfaction” at having killed Mr.
Prochilo.211 Thus, although Mr. Sullivan’s cognitive injury had an impact, it
did not assist him because the sentencing judge found it made him more
dangerous such that the principle of community protection was given more
weight in the sentence imposed.212 Mr. Sullivan was sentenced to a nonparole period of eighteen years and nine months.213
C.

Table 1: Summation of the Case Studies from New South Wales

Table 1 summarizes each of the six case studies discussed above and
delineates: whether the offender’s sentence was mitigated at least, in part,
based on neuroscientific evidence of brain impairment; the offense
committed with a brief statement of the facts; the offender’s cognitive
impairment; evidence of the impairment; the sentence imposed with
additional information about any applicable statutory maximum sentence
and non-parole period; and the rationale for the sentence.

207

Id. at 64.
R v Sullivan was decided before Muldrock v The Queen and Martin v R, which created ambiguity
regarding whether matters particular to the offender may influence the sentencing judge’s consideration of
the objective seriousness of the offense or whether they are matters personal to the offender. Muldrock v
The Queen [2011] 249 CLR 120 (HCA) (Austl.).
209
R v Sullivan [2010] NSWSC 755 (9 July 2010) (Austl.).
210
Id.
211
Id. at 22.
212
Sullivan v R [2012] NSWSC 41 (Austl.).
213
R v Sullivan [2010] NSWSC 755 (9 July 2010) (Austl.).
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Case

Offense

Cognitive
Impairment

Evidence of
Impairment

Sentence
(non-parole
period)

Rationale for
Sentence

R
v
Terrence
David Kain
(2013)

Manslaughter

Alcoholinduced
persisting
dementia;
brain damage
resulting
in
poor
executive
functioning,
including poor
judgment and
lack
of
behavioral
control

Neuropsychol
ogical
assessment;
MRI

4 years214

Mitigated
due
to
genuine remorse, lack
of criminal history,
guilty plea, and limited
executive functioning;
as a result of his
psychiatric condition,
Mr. Kain was not an
appropriate vehicle for
deterrence, was not a
danger, and would face
exceptional challenges
in prison

Mild
dementia;
widespread
small vessel
disease
affecting the
temporal and
parietal lobes
of the brain;
loss
of
judgment and
inhibition

Neuropsychol
ogical
assessment;
MRI

Seizure
disorder due
to head injury;
likely
lobe
damage
manifesting in

Neuropsychol
ogical
assessment;
MRI

(Strangled his
mother)
Mitigated

EG v
(2015)

R

Mitigated

Aggravated
sexual
intercourse
with a child
under ten years
of age

(Licked
his
two-year-old
granddaughter’
s vagina)

Carroll v R
(2012)

214

Grievous
bodily
harm
with intent

(max of 25
years)215

1 year

(max
of
life;216
standard
non-parole
period of 15
years217)

4 years

(max of 25
years;218

Mitigated from a nonparole period of 2
years, 6 months to 1
year;
Applicant’s
mental condition could
have
affected
his
judgment, and due to
the unusual factual
circumstances and the
absence
of
a
gratification element,
specific deterrence and
protection
of
the
community were less
significant

Mitigated from a nonparole period of 6
years to 4 years;
although Mr. Carroll
had a criminal record,
significant
weight

Although section 25B of the Crimes Act 1900 now requires a mandatory minimum sentence of
eight years for Assault Causing Death when Intoxicated irrespective of section 21 of the Crimes
(Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, the mandatory minimum was not required until 2014 when the Act was
amended, see Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment (Assault and Intoxication) Act 2014 (NSW).
215
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 25, repealed by Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment (Assault and
Intoxication) Act 2014 (NSW).
216
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 66A.
217
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 2014 (NSW) pt IV div 1A Table item 10.
218
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 33.
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Case

Offense

Mitigated

(Cut
victim’s
forearm
face)

Aslan v R
(2014)

Not
mitigated

Not
mitigated

219
220
221
222
223

the

Evidence of
Impairment

and

lack of selfcontrol
and
impulsivity

Indecent
assault,
attempted
sexual
intercourse
without
consent, sexual
intercourse
without
consent

Brain injury
leading to a
diagnosis of
depression
and executive
dysfunction
such
as
impulsivity
and
poor
judgment

Neuropsychol
ogical
assessment

Anxiety and
depression;
epilepsy;
sexually
abused as a
child;
congenital
brain

Neuropsychol
ogical
assessment;
MRI

(Raped
victim)

R v Lane
(2013)

Cognitive
Impairment

Murder

(Shot
killed
lover’s

and
her
long-

Sentence
(non-parole
period)

Rationale for
Sentence

standard
non-parole
period of 7
years219)

should be given to the
impact of Mr. Carroll’s
head injuries and the
resulting lack of temper
control on his behavior;
the sentencing judge
should have considered
the reduced deterrence
value
and
moral
culpability; Mr. Carroll
also expressed remorse

Aggregate
sentence of
6 years

Although Mr. Aslan’s
cognitive impairment
would make his prison
term more onerous,
moderating to a very
small degree the value
of general deterrence,
the Court did not
accept
that
Mr.
Aslan’s
cognitive
impairment had a direct
impact on the offense
and did not mitigate his
sentence based on
reduced
moral
culpability or specific
or general deterrence

([attempted]
sexual
intercourse
without
consent:
max of 14
years,220
standard
non-parole
period of 7
years;221
indecent
assault: max
of
5
years222)

the
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17 years

(max
of
life;223
standard
non-parole

Because Ms. Lane’s
mental problems were
more emotional than
cognitive, she was not
entitled to any marked
degree of leniency and
was awarded a slightly
lesser sentence only

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 2014 (NSW) pt IV div 1A Table item 4.
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 61I.
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 2014 (NSW) pt IV div 1A Table item 7.
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 61L.
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 19A.
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Case

R
v
Sullivan
(2010)

Not
mitigated

V.

The Criminal Mind

Offense

Cognitive
Impairment

time partner)

impairments;
decline
in
intellectual
functioning

Murder

Depressive
symptoms;
parietal skull
fracture;
cognitive
impairments
suggestive of
frontal
lobe
damage
associated
with
impulsive
behavior and
poor judgment

(Stabbed
the
victim in the
chest)

Evidence of
Impairment

Neuropsychol
ogical
assessment;
MRI
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Sentence
(non-parole
period)

Rationale for
Sentence

period of 20
years224)

because
guilty

18 years and
9 months

Mr. Sullivan’s brain
impairment was not
sufficiently
causally
related to the offense to
qualify as a mitigating
factor beyond a slight
mitigation in general
deterrence;
Mr.
Sullivan’s
previous
conviction
for
manslaughter and risk
to community safety
counteracted
the
impact
of
his
neurological
and
physiological
dysfunction on his
sentence

(max
of
life;225
standard
non-parole
period of 20
years226)

she

plead

NEUROSCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IS NEITHER CONSISTENTLY NOR
ROBUSTLY USED TO MITIGATE OFFENDERS’ SENTENCES IN NEW SOUTH
WALES

Professor Jones cautions that “[Neuroscience] is one of those things
that holds both promise and terror for the legal system.”227 However, the six
case studies reveal that currently, neuroscientific evidence does not play a
significant role in the legal system in New South Wales, even though judges
have the discretionary capacity to allocate it more weight in sentencing,
because it is not sufficiently developed to be applied consistently in
sentencing or offer significant insight into the criminal mind. The cases
indicate that neuroscientific evidence is not understood well enough to serve
as more than a discretionary tool of the sentencing judge that is sometimes
224
225
226
227

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 2014 (NSW) pt IV div 1A Table item 1.
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 19A.
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 2014 (NSW) pt IV div 1A Table item 1.
Davis, supra note 21.
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used to mitigate an offender’s sentence and sometimes not, absent any
identifiable pattern among cases.
One of the purposes of the application of neuroscience to the law is to
gain a more comprehensive understanding of the psychology of criminal
responsibility. It is apparent from the case studies, however, that the
criminal mind remains elusive; in many cases, neuroscientific evidence is
unable to definitively determine the nature of the relationship between an
offender's brain impairment and the offense, or in some cases, the strength of
the relationship between them. The case studies indicate that there is no
identifiable trend in how neuroscientific evidence is used to mitigate an
offender’s sentence; however, evidence of an offender’s cognitive
impairment appears to bear more weight and serve as more of a mitigating
influence in the presence of other favorable circumstances. In addition,
judges’ seemingly arbitrary evaluation of the weight of neuroscientific
evidence of offenders’ brain impairments in some circumstances suggests
that judges may not currently have the expertise to apply neuroscience in
sentencing.
A.

Mitigation Based on a Cognitive Impairment Is More Likely
when There Are Other Factors Favorable to the Defendant

These case studies illustrate that a court is more likely to mitigate an
offender’s sentence seemingly based on neurological evidence of a cognitive
impairment when there are other factors favorable to an offender as in Mr.
Kain’s case, in EG v R, and in Mr. Carroll’s case. These factors may include
no criminal history, an expression of remorse, or factual circumstances that
appear out of character for the offender, indicating, for example, a lesser risk
of recidivism and reduced potential danger to the public. However, when
there are adverse factors, evidence of a cognitive impairment appears to
have little influence or may be counteracted by a factor unfavorable to the
offender, as in Mr. Sullivan’s case. Therefore, evidence of cognitive
dysfunction, in isolation, does not play an influential role in mitigation, but
is just one among many factors, which, taken holistically, determine an
offender’s sentence. In addition, the great discretion a court exercises in
sentencing means a sentencing judge may weigh neuroscientific evidence
however he or she pleases, which leads to the type of inconsistency that is
illustrated by the cases regarding how evidence of a brain impairment is
used in each offender’s sentencing proceeding.
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In R v Terrence David Kain, the Supreme Court of New South Wales
mitigated Mr. Kain’s sentence primarily due to his alcohol-induced
persisting dementia and brain damage resulting in poor executive
functioning, but also considered his lack of criminal history, his guilty plea,
and genuine remorse. Similarly, in EG v R, the Court of Criminal Appeal
held that the offender’s widespread small vessel disease affecting his brain
function warranted mitigation in the context of the unusual factual
circumstances and the offender’s lack of criminal history. In Carroll v R,
the Court of Criminal Appeal found that Mr. Carroll’s head injury, resulting
in frontal lobe damage, contributed to his lack of temper control and
consequently, his commission of the offense, which warranted mitigation.
Notable is the fact that Mr. Carroll expressed remorse and a desire to
apologize to the victim. Although Mr. Carroll had a criminal history,
including a number of offenses involving assault, in the ten years prior to the
offense Mr. Carroll had only one violent offense for which he was merely
fined. The Court found that Mr. Carroll’s sole offense the decade prior to
the current offense seemingly involved a low level of criminality, and
therefore did not appear to use his criminal history as an influential factor in
sentencing. Mr. Carroll’s case is a prime example of the discretion a court
yields in sentencing concerning how to weigh a defendant’s criminal history
in addition to other subjective factors, which leads to inconsistencies in
sentencing.
In contrast, the Supreme Court of New South Wales held in R v Lane
that although Ms. Lane had some congenital brain impairments, the impact
of which were uncertain, and a host of emotional challenges, her mental
difficulties were not sufficiently cognitively based to serve as a mitigating
factor. Ms. Lane’s case speaks to the uncertainty surrounding neuroscience,
how it should be used in the courtroom, and if the sentencing judge is the
appropriate actor to make the determination of how brain impairment
influences an offender’s sentence, addressed below.
In R v Sullivan, the Supreme Court of New South Wales found that Mr.
Sullivan’s cognitive impairments resulting from a skull fracture were not
sufficiently causally related to the offense to significantly mitigate his
sentence. In addition, the Court held that Mr. Sullivan’s previous conviction
for manslaughter and consequent danger to the public counteracted the
minor mitigating influence of his impairment. It is important to note that
there is not stronger evidence of the effect of Mr. Carroll’s cognitive
impairment on his commission of the offense than in Mr. Sullivan’s case.
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While both Mr. Carroll and Mr. Sullivan had criminal history, the Court of
Criminal Appeal did not characterize Mr. Carroll’s criminal history as
serious and noted that he expressed remorse, while the Supreme Court of
New South Wales held that Mr. Sullivan’s criminal history outweighed the
influence of his impairment and noted that Mr. Sullivan expressed
satisfaction as opposed to remorse at having killed the deceased.
Consequently, the Court of Criminal Appeal found that significant weight
should be given to Mr. Carroll’s cognitive impairment, which resulted in
mitigation, whereas the Supreme Court of New South Wales held that Mr.
Sullivan’s criminal history outweighed the influence of his impairment.
Thus, it appears not only that the mitigation Principles were weighted
differently in each case, but also that the neuroscientific evidence was not
applied consistently.
Also notable is that no offender’s sentence from any of the six cases
was significantly mitigated due to Principle 1 articulated in case law:
reduced moral culpability. In fact, in Aslan v R, the District Court judge
made explicit that Mr. Aslan’s frontal lobe damage did not warrant a
mitigated sentence based on reduced moral culpability. However, there are
examples where the court, on appeal, has found reduced moral culpability
based on a cognitive impairment.228 At least some cases in which the New
South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal has considered moral culpability a
mitigating factor, including Barbieri v R, Martin v R, and Cowan v R,
involve the Court of Appeal finding the District Court erred in sentencing
either because it did not consider moral culpability in sentencing or because
it did not find that moral culpability was a substantially mitigating factor.229
Unlike specific or general deterrence value, moral culpability is more
subjective and stems from retributive principles or the notion that the
offender is deserving of punishment because of the harm he or she
inflicted.230 The six case studies and the three cases listed above indicate
228

See, e.g., Barbieri v R [2016] NSWCCA 295 (12 December 2016) (Austl.); see also Martin v R
[2015] NSWCCA 48–53 (10 February 2015) (Austl.); see also Cowan v R [2015] NSWCCA 188 (29 May
2015) (Austl.).
229
See Barbieri at 1 (holding that it was erroneous to conclude the applicant’s moral culpability was
not reduced to any substantial degree); see also Martin at 56, 60 (finding that the District Court should have
assessed whether the applicant’s moral culpability was reduced and holding that the applicant’s moral
culpability was slightly reduced due to his mental disorders); see also Cowan at 6, 69 (finding that the
District Court should have considered the applicant’s moral culpability as a mitigating factor).
230
See RAINE, supra note 18, at 319; see also Allan McCay & Jeanette Kennett, Can neuroscience
revolutionise the way we punish criminals? Retributivism is still alive and well, INDEPENDENT (May 30,
2016, 3:31 BST), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/can-neuroscience-revolutionise-the-way-wepunish-criminals-a7056476.html.
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that there is ambiguity concerning the application of the moral culpability
reduction principle. Reluctance to reduce an offender’s moral culpability
solely based on a cognitive impairment, at least by the District Court, may
implicate the philosophical underpinnings of the criminal justice system and
suggest that society is not prepared to recognize that evidence of a brain
impairment should or could allow an offender to avoid receiving his or her
just deserts.
B.

The Sentencing Judge May Not Yet Possess the Necessary
Expertise to Apply Neuroscience in the Courtroom

As noted in the previous section, the case studies illustrate that the
judiciary may not be the most qualified body to weigh neurological evidence
of an offender’s cognitive impairment in sentencing proceedings. In R v
Lane, an MRI showed brain abnormalities likely of a congenital origin. In
addition, two experts who independently examined Ms. Lane testified that
the MRI showed she suffered from brain impairment, rsulting in reduced
intellectual functioning and flexibility of thinking, and recommended that
she raise her impairment as a mitigating factor. Despite the experts’
findings, the Supreme Court of New South Wales held that due to the
emotional background of her killing her lover’s long-time partner, her
impairments were more emotional than cognitive and therefore should not
serve as a significant mitigating influence.
The sentencing judge’s determination is problematic for two reasons.
First, the judge effectively disregarded the experts’ testimony and made his
or her own determination of the effect of Ms. Lane’s impairment on her
behavior. Second, the sentencing judge made a stark distinction between
emotion and cognition, which Professor Raine suggests cannot be done so
easily. For example, Professor Raine discusses how abnormalities in the
prefrontal cortex can manifest at numerous functional levels, including both
an emotional and a cognitive level. Manifestation at an emotional level
could include anger, while manifestation at a cognitive level could include
loss of intellectual flexibility. The experts in Ms. Lane’s case emphasized
how her impairment affected her intellectual function and therefore
identified dysfunction on a cognitive level. However, the sentencing judge
decided that in Ms. Lane’s case, her “mental problems” affected her more on
an emotional level due to the emotional background of the killing. The
judge’s determination, therefore, does not account for the ability of a
structural abnormality to manifest at numerous levels, including both
emotional and cognitive. Further, the Principles that a court should consider
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in sentencing individuals with a mental illness, intellectual handicap or other
mental or emotional impairment or disability, make clear that the Principles
should be considered if the individual has a mental or emotional impairment.
Also seemingly arbitrary was the judge’s determination in Aslan v R
that Mr. Aslan’s brain impairment did not directly influence his commission
of the offense. Psychiatrist, Dr. Allnutt, testified that Mr. Aslan suffered
behavioral ramifications, including impulsivity, likely as a result of
traumatic brain injury from two motor vehicle accidents. Although the
sentencing judge determined that Mr. Aslan’s brain injury could make him
more susceptible to abusing drugs and alcohol, the judge found that Mr.
Aslan’s impairment did not play a causative role concerning the incident.
Similar to Ms. Lane’s case, the judge’s findings of cause and effect do not
appear to be supported by either expert opinion or other neuroscientific
evidence.
Ms. Lane and Mr. Aslan’s cases make clear that the sentencing judge
may draw conclusions about the relationship between an offender’s brain
impairment and the offense completely independent of, and sometimes
contrary to, expert opinion, scientific studies or neuroscientific tools. In his
article, Judges as “Amateur Scientists,” Professor Faigman asserts that
“judges, on the whole, have little training in, knowledge of, or inclination to
learn science.”231 To be better equipped to apply neuroscience to sentencing,
an arena largely entrusted to the judiciary, judges should make it an
imperative to become inclined to learn science; as neurolaw continues to
develop and play a more prominent role in criminal law, judges must adapt
to changing circumstances to adequately uphold the aims of sentencing,
including specific and general deterrence, public safety, and retribution, and
for the posterity of the criminal justice system more generally.232
VI.

CONCLUSION

As neuroscience continues to evolve, the relationship between an
offender’s cognitive impairment and criminal responsibility may become
231

Faigman, supra note 106, at 1207 (2006).
For further discussion regarding why judges must be better versed in science to be effective
jurists, see Faigman, supra note 106. See also Leanne Houston & Amy Vierboom, Neuroscience and Law:
Australia, in INTERNATIONAL NEUROLAW 19 (T.M. Spranger ed., 2012) (explaining that fMRI lie-detection
data, introduced in the guilt phase of criminal trials, cannot be treated as conclusive evidence and require
legal practitioners to defer to scientific expertise because there remains subjective criteria of intention.) The
use of fMRI lie-detection data in the guilt phase can be analogized to neuroscientific evidence in sentencing
and suggests that a judge’s role cannot be subverted by that of experts.
232
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more certain. Currently, however, the application of neuroscientific
evidence in sentencing in New South Wales is limited. Although Dr. Raine
identifies how reduced prefrontal cortex functioning results in impaired
functioning at an emotional, behavioral, personality, social, and cognitive
level, neuroscientists cannot identify a definitive causal link between
reduced cognitive functioning and the commission of an offense. This lack
of certainty means that the sentencing judge retains the discretion to decide
if and how to weigh evidence of an impairment, which begs the question as
to whether the judiciary is the body best suited to understand the intersection
between science and the law and to make those determinations. The six case
studies indicate that judges do not possess sufficient understanding of
neuroscience to use neurological evidence in sentencing consistently, and I
assert that they should prioritize familiarizing themselves with science so as
to adapt to scientific developments. An additional consideration for future
research should therefore concern the inherent biases of each sentencing
judge and his or her familiarity with and perception of the utility of
neuroscientific evidence.
Evidence of a cognitive impairment becomes just one more factor
among the many aggravating and mitigating factors that a sentencing judge
considers holistically when making a sentencing determination. My analysis
of the six case studies illustrates that neuroscientific evidence of a cognitive
impairment is nothing more than one factor among many, and does not serve
as a significant mitigating influence unless there are other factors favorable
to the defendant, such as a guilty plea or good character, which, taken
together, encourage a more lenient sentence. The cases also indicate that
there is not a consensus regarding how or if an offender’s cognitive
impairment translates into reduced moral culpability and thereby warrants a
mitigated sentence. Judges’ reluctance to find that a cognitive impairment
may mean an offender is not as deserving of punishment maintains broader
implications about the retributivist aim233 of the criminal justice system. For
now, punishment still matters in New South Wales, and until neuroscience
offers further insight into the criminal mind, it will not provide a strong
incentive for mitigation in sentencing.

233

See Houston & Vierboom, Neuroscience and Law: Australia, supra note 233 (asserting that not all
sense of “punishment” could be eliminated, even in a system of restorative justice, because it is a form of
recompense to the victim and is a fundamental tenet of the legal system).

